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INSTALMENT PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS

Frederick Woodbridge*

A

PROBLEM which has long confronted and troubled society is
that of devising satisfactory means whereby the small debtor
who is primarily a wage earner can be forced to pay his creditors and,
at the same time, be protected from those creditors who use every coercive device to take from him the last farthing. 1 The problem has come
to the fore with the development, during the past two decades, of instalment selling of practically every commodity offered on the open
market. It is a problem that is important not only in periods of economic depression and unemployment, but in times when business is
picking up after such periods of depression-when creditors who have
been held off attempt to collect long outstanding debts.2 The wage
earner is then returning to work and his wages immediately become the
target for writs of garnishment.3
One method of modern origin for settling such a problem through
legal channels under judicial supervision, but without orthodox adversary proceedings, that of "personal receivership," was investigated by

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. Formerly Visiting Assistant
Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B., Ohio Northern; LL.B., Cincinnati;
LL.M., Harvard; S.J.D., Michigan. Author of articles in various legal periodicals.-Ed.
1
Hamilton, "In Re the Small Debtor," 42 YALE L. J. 473 (1933).
2
GLENN, LIQUIDATION l et seq. (1935).
3
Minnesota has, by recent legislation, attempted to give the hardpressed debtor
who has been a relief client and who is returning to work after a period of unemployment a breathing spell from garnishment, by providing that the wages of a debtor
"who is or has been a recipient of relief based on need shall, upon his return to private
employment after having been a recipient of public relief, be exempt from attachment,
garnishment or levy of execution for a period of six months after his return to employment.•••" Minn. Laws (1939), c. 263, Minn. Stat. (Mason Supp. 1940), § 9447
(16), noted 24 MrnN. L. REv. 240 at 245 (1940). The Attorney General of Minnesota has ruled that employment by the Works Projects Administration, if granted for the
purpose of relieving actual need to a person who would otherwise be compelled to seek
public relief, would bring a debtor within the exemption conferred by the statute
when he returned to private employment. Ops. Atty. Gen. of Minn. (1939), No. 843K,
cited in 24 MINN. L. REv. 240 at 246 (1940).
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the writer two years ago. 4 While making that study in the courts, something was observed of the working of a new device for securing the satisfaction of judgments rendered after the orthodox adversary proceedings were had-the payment of judgments by instalments.
This article is concerned primarily with a discussion of satisfaction
of judgments by instalment payments where the judgment debtor is
the typical American wage earner. 5 It is based upon an analysis of the
applicable statutes, the experience recorded' in decided cases, interviews with numerous judges administering the statutes, and observations in certain of the courts where that method is used. 6
So long as the extension of credit resulting from glib methods of
advertising and persuasive salesmanship cannot be controlled at its
source under our form of government, it would seem that society
should recognize that the small debtor problem is here to stay and
should continually examine the methods used to solve it in order to
determine whether they are producing satisfactory results efficiently. 1
4
A comprehensive report of this study will be found in NINTH ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE JUDICIAL CouNCIL OF MICHIGAN 57 et seq. (1939). A condensed version of
the same study is found in Woodbridge, "Wage Earners' Receiverships," 23 J. AM. Juo.
Soc. 242 (1940).
5
A few closely related problems concerning small debtors whose income is received from fees, spendthrift trusts and gifts will be mentioned incidentally.
6
For the information concerning the use of instalment orders in the Flint Municipal Court, I am indebted to Judge Frank Cain and his Clerk, Mr. Cletus Bush; in
the Pontiac Municipal Court to Judge Milton Cooney; in the Highland Park Municipal Court to Judge George L. Badder; in the Justice of the Peace Court for Hamtramck to Judge Nicholas Grankowski; and in the Cleveland Municipal Court to Chief
Justice Burt W. Griffin.
1
Some examinations and re-examinations of this problem and the methods for
solving it will be found in the following articles: Fortas, "Wage Assignments in Chicago
-State Street Furniture Co. v. Armour & Co.," 42 YALE L. J. 526 (1933); Nehemkis,
"The Boston Poor Debtor Court-A Study in Collection Procedure," 42 YALE L. J.
561 (1933); Hamilton, "In Re The Small Debtor," 42 YALE L. J. 473 (1933);
Sturges and Cooper, "Credit Administration and Wage Earner Bankruptcies," 42 YALE
L. J. 487 (1933); Douglas, "Wage Earner Bankruptcies-State vs. Federal Control,"
42 YALE L. J. 591 (1933); Douglas and Marshall, "A Factual Study of Bankruptcy
Administration and Some Suggestions," 32 CoL. L. REv. 25 (1932); 24 VA. L. REV.
66 (1937); 9 Wis. L. REv. 177 (1934); Minahan, "Wage-Earner Garnishment: A
Plan for Personal Receivership," IO Wis. L. REv. 223 (1935); Garrison, "Wisconsin's
New 'Personal Receivership' Law," 1938 Wis. L. REv. 201; Sturges, "A Proprosed State Collection Act," 43 YALE L. J. 1055 (1934); and article cited supra,
note 4. See also S. Doc. 65, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., (1931) ("Report of the Justice
Department to the President on the Bankruptcy Act and Its Administration in the
Courts of the United States"); James, "The Collection of Money Ju·dgments in Connecticut: An Analysis with Proposals," 14 CoNN. B. J. 3, 91 (1940). And see 45 HARV.
L. REv. 1102 (1932); Conard, "Judgment-Proof Wealth-A Study of Some Deficiencies in Pennsylvania Attachment Executions," 42 D1cK. L. REv. I 19 ( 193 8) ; Cohen,
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I
ORTHODOX METHODS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF THE CREDITOR
VERsus THE SMALL DEBTOR WHo IS PRIMARILY A WAGE EARNER

The methods of adjustment of these problems have ordinarily been
the products of the times. When a method or system, over a period of
time, has become a habit with those who use it, however, it is quite
likely to remain in effect much longer than the existence of the conditions out of which it grew.8
Since the middle of the last century when the Field Code was drafted
there has been considerable procedural reform. That reform has continued at an accelerated pace the past few years with the drafting of the
new rules of federal procedure and the attendant professional comment,
criticism, and textual treatment. In the main, however, while the
method for securing a speedy determination of the trial of cases has
been streamlined so that cases may be tried and judgments secured
with a minimum of technical resistance on the part of either opposing
counsel or the courts, reform has, in general, stopped there. 9
Historically, many coercive devices have been used by the judgment creditor to force the judgment debtor to pay. Imprisonment for
"Collection of Money Judgments in New York: Supplementary Proceedings," and
"Third Party Orders," 35 CoL. L. REv. 1007 at 1041, u96 (1935); King, "The
Enforcement of Money Judgments in California," II So. CAL. L. REv. 224 (1938);
Moss, "Supplementary Proceedings in Wisconsin," 23 MARQ. L. REV. 49 (1939).
8 In the 1926 edition of the Civil Practice Act of New York, at the beginning of
the article on executions generally {art. 42) appears the following: "The objections to
our existing system of court practice are directed against the procedure in an action up to
the time of obtaining judgment. . . . The method of obtaining satisfaction of a judgment by execution is well defined, has been in successful operation for many years, and
is not the subject of criticism from either the courts or the members of the profession.
It may also be noted that the sections of the code relating to executions are very infrequently amended and that most of them have stood in their present form without
any change since their original enactment. . . . These sections have stood the test of
trial and under them personal and property rights have been settled with but comparatively little litigation. . . ." 4 GILBERT-Buss, C1v1L PRACTICE OF NEW YoRK
146 (1926) (italics supplied). Compare with it the results of money judgment collections found to exist in 1930 by the researchers for the Commission on the Administration of Justice in New York State. See infra at note 29. With reference to the
many changes made in the procedure for collecting money judgments in New York in
1935, the SECOND REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CoUNCIL OF NEW YoRK 13 (1936),
states: "this subject is considered fundamental because, due to the ineffectiveness of
past procedure, the effort and money expended in obtaining money judgments has
frequently proven pure waste. The ineffectiveness of the procedure in the past was
stated to be inexcusable. It is believed the new law will help to remedy the situation."
9
See SECOND REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CouNcIL OF NEw YORK 13 (1936).
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debt appears in many of the older legal systems and is not unknown
in the law today. 10 Its only possible merit is as a pressure device to force
the debtor to pay. There is no pecuniary satisfaction to the creditor in the
fact of imprisonment. The judgment creditor could and still may have
execution issued against the personal or real property of the judgment
debtor if the latter has any.11 If the judgment is for a small amount,
however, such as a judgment from a small claims court-and far more
judgments of that type are rendered than any other-the cost of such
an execution with its attendant sale is entirely out of proportion in most
cases to the amount actually involved. Assuming the existence of such
property, the judgment creditor, to secure satisfaction of his judgment,
'must resort to a method of execution which had its origin in times past
and which is attuned to the needs of an agrarian society instead of today's highly industrialized urban society.
Obstructions and hazards have confronted the judgment creditor
at every turn. The burden is, in most cases, placed upon him to find
some property belonging to the judgment debtor upon which he can
execute. This is difficult, for most wage-earner debtors in industrial
areas have very little, if any, non-exempt property. What property
they have is usually being paid for on the instalment lease or conditional sales contract plan, or is comparatively worthless. This leaves
only one source of satisfaction for the judgment creditor-the debtor's
wages. For all practical purposes, then, so far as wage earners are concerned, wage garnishment remains the principal method today for
securing satisfaction of money judgments.12

A.

Difficulties Inherent in the Use of Wage Garnishments

First among these difficulties is the rule of diligence or priority
among attaching creditors. Fruits of the garnishment go to the first
TwELVE TABLES, Nos. I, III (circa 450 B. C.); BucKLAND, THE MAIN
INSTITUTIONS OF RoMAN PRIVATE LAW 348-349 (1931); J0Low1cz, H1sTORICAL
INTRODUCTION TO RoMAN LAW 190 (1932); HARGRAVE, A CoLLECTION OF TRAc'IS
RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND 359 (1787); HOLDSWORTH, CHARLES DICKENS
AS A LEGAL HISTORIAN 136 (1929); Fox, "Process of Imprisonment at Common Law,"
39 L. Q. REV. 46 (1923); HANNA, CASES ON CREDITOR'S RIGHTS, 2d ed., 26 (1935);
Ford, "Imprisonment for Debt," 25 M1cH. L. REv. 24 (1926); 32 & 33 Viet., c. 62
(1869).
11 I SHINN, ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT, §§ 1, 2 (1896); 2 id., §§ 465,
467; 2 WADE, ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT 1, 19 (1886); Penoyar v. Kelsey,
150 N. Y. 77, 44 N. E. 788 (1896).
12
"Demonstration of the successful employment by retailers of the comparatively
long-term credit involved in installment selling has opened a range of possibilities
which are no longer confined by the character of merchandise. Although some tangible
10
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writ served on the garnishee defendant, with ordinarily nothing left
for any junior writ. 13 While this rule has been abrogated in some juris:dictions by statutory provision for underfiling, or what might more
aptly be termed the abolition of priorities among attaching creditors, 14
it still remains in most jurisdictions. Hence a creditor may find that his
garnishment writ is not only junior to a previous writ, but that he has
costs to pay of some $I to $3 for an ineffectual writ. Second, as a practical non-legal matter, he may find that if garnishments are continually
being issued to the employer of the judgment debtor, the latter may
soon be among the unemployed with all chance of collecting the judgment debt vanished.15 Third, there is the ever-present possibility that
if creditors continually harass a debtor who is willing to pay if given
time and opportunity but who, because of the diligence of certain types
of creditors, is not given some consideration, he will resort to bankruptcy and "wipe the slate clean." In the case of small wage earners,
this usually means an absolute economic loss for all creditors. 16 Fourth,
a garnishment served upon a garnishee defendant seeking to reach
wages of a judgment debtor is usually effective only as to wages then
due when the writ is served. 11 New garnishments must be issued if
protection for an unpaid balance is still a primary factor, there can be no doubt that
the assured income of the buyer is a guarantee of repayment against which repossession
is but a poor substitute." RETAIL CREDIT SuRVEY I 2 ( I 937).
13
GLENN, LIQUIDATION, § 5 (1935); 8 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW, 2d ed., 232 (1937).
14 E.g., 2 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933), §§ 3-534, 3-535; I N. J. Rev. Stat.
(1937), § 2:42-17; Del. Rev. Code (1935), c. 126, § 15; I Idaho Code Ann. (1932),
c. 6, § 503 (§ 4620); Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935), c, 96, § 66; I Ontario Rev. Stat.
(193.7), c. 126, §§ 3, 4; I Saskatchewan Rev. Stat. (1930),c. 67, § 3; I British Columbia Rev. Stat. (1936), c. 64; 2 Alberta Rev. Stat. (1922), c. 88, §§ 3, 4; 2 New
Brunswick Rev. Stat. (1927), c. 133, § 3; 2 Nova Scotia Rev. Stat. (1923), c. 237;
Trinidad Nat. Bank v. Jamieson House Furnishing Co., 60 Colo. 356, 153 P. 441
( I 9 I 5) ; Howard v. Grimes Pass Placer Mining Co., 2 I Idaho 12, I 20 P. I 70 ( 191 1) ;
Greene v. Rice, 32 Idaho 504, 186 P. 249 (1919).; Lexington & Big Sandy R. R. v.
Ford Plate Glass Co., 84 Ind. 516 (1882). In general, see Sturges, "A Proposed
State Collection Act," 43 YALE L. J. 1055 (1934).
15
Garrison, "Wisconsin's New 'Personal Receivership' Law," 1938 Wis. L. REv.
201 at 205; Economy Lease~, Inc. v. Bierman, 159 Misc. 367, 286 N. Y. S. 732
(1936).
16
"It may be of interest to note that wage earners constitute over 50 per cent of
all bankruptcy cases." Report of Mr. Chandler on Revision of the National Bankruptcy
Act, H. REP. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st sess. (1937), p. 54.
17
Ridabock & Co. v. Scanlon, 71 Misc. 505, I 30 N. Y. S. 83 I ( 1911); Overturf
v. Gerlach, 62 Ohio St. 127, 56 N. E. 653 (1900); Medical Finance Assn. v. Short,
36 Cal. App. (2d) 745, 92 P. (2d) 961 (1939); Medical Finance Assn. v. Karnes,
32 Cal. App. (2d) 767, 84 P. (2d) 1076 (1938).
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future wages are to ·be reached. A conspiring employer may pay his
employees each day if he wishes and thus, for all practical purposes,
defeat any effect of a wage garnishment. Fifth, wage garnishments may
be defeated if the judgment debtor can anticipate their issuance by a
wage assignment where such is not prohibited by statute.18 Sixth, wage
garnishments against the "fee man"-the doctor, lawyer, commission
salesman and the like-are practically ineffective.19 Seventh, if a local
resident is working for an employer residing out of the jurisdiction who
has no local managing agent upon whom service of process can be made,
garnishments are ineffectual, for the local courts have no jurisdiction
to issue process upon a garnishee defendant out of their jurisdiction.20
Eighth, collusive practices have been tried whereby an employer "advances" money to an employee and, when garnishment against the employer has been had by a creditor, the garnishee defendant merely
retains the wages by virtue of some "prearranged" assignment in repayment of the "advances" previously made. 21 Ninth, a debtor in business may place the business in the name of a near relative or his wife,
or may form a "family corporation" and work for them or it for no
salary or just sufficient salary to come within wage exemptions.22 Finally, the right of a creditor to garnish the wages of an employee of the
federal, state, or municipal government or of a governmental corporation depends upon the existence of statutory authority to maintain the
suit.28 Some confusion exists with reference to the construction of such
permissive statutes concerning the amenability of the sovereign or its
corporate assistants to garnishment process against salaries or wages of
A few states have provided, however, that wage garnishments may be continuing
upon wages or income earned or to be received in the future. N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act
(193.7), § 684; IN. J. Rev. Stat. (1937), §§ 2:32-180 to 2:32-183; Reliance Investing Co. v. Power, 136 Misc. 694, 240 N. Y. S. 585 (1930); Hayward v. Hayward,
178 App. Div. 92, 164 N. Y. S. 877 (1917); Cross v. LaCorte, (N. J. S. Ct. 1933)
168 A. 849; Russell v. Mechanics' Realty Co., 88 N. J. L. 532, 96 A. 657 (1916);
White v. White, 94 N. J. Eq. 278, 120 A. 419 (1923); Credit Adjusters & Collectors
v. Bergen Essex Const. Co., (N. J. S. Ct. 1940) II A. (2d) 755.
18
Compare Rosenberg v. Parlay Hats, Inc., 144 Misc. 519, 258 N. Y. S. 949
(1932). On wage assignments in general, see Fortas, "Wage Assignments in Chicago-State Street Furniture Co. v. Armour & Co.," 42 YALE L. J. 526 (1933).
19
Compare Hill v. Central Trust Co., 33 Ohio App. 204, 168 N. E. 768 (1929).
20
Penrose & McEniry v. Manogue, 129 Misc. 512, 221 N. Y. S. 758 (1927);
Buckeye Pipe Line Co. v. Fee, 62 Ohio St. 543, 57 N. E. 446 (1900).
21
Rosenberg v. Parlay Hats, Inc., 144 Misc. 519, 258 N. Y. S. 949 (1932).
22
Flapan v. Rosenblum, 119 Misc. 625, 19§ N. Y. S. 892 (1922).
28
Federal Housing Administration, Region No. 4 v. Burr, 309 U. S. 242, 60
S. Ct. 488 (1940).
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their respective employees. 24 With the great rise in the number of governmental employees, the problem is a pressing one. Obviously, the
fruits of spendthrift trusts, where their validity is recognized, cannot
be reached by garnishment without statutory aid. 25
These, then, are the chief methods used to evade payment of obligations sought to be enforced through wage garnishment proceedings
and the chief obstacles which confront the judgment creditor in his
quest for satisfaction of a judgment against a wage earner through what
is practically his only route to that end.
Closely allied today with the use of wage garnishment is the subject of exemptions.26 Most of the present exemption statutes are too
inflexible to cover many of the situations which arise. A canvass of the
statutes in the various states shows that they are not kept up to date
so far as the index of living costs are concerned.21 That they should be
made as simple as possible is self-evident. But their simplicity should
not be used to conceal the distress that may be behind them. The prime
24 Compare Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Hardie & Caudle, 171 Tenn. 43, 100
S. W. (2d) 238, 108 A. L. R. 702 at 705 (1936), with Gill v. Reese, 53 Ohio App.
134, 4 N. E. (2d) 273 (1936).
25 Brearly School v. Ward, 201 N. Y. 358, 94 N. E. 1001 (19II); Congress
Hotel v. Martin, 312 Ill. 318, 143 N. E. 838 (1924); l BoGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES, § 222 et seq. (1935); 1 Scorr, TRUSTS, § 152.3 (1939); Griswold,
"Reaching the Interest of the Beneficiary of a Spendthrift Trust," 43 HARV. L. REV.
63 (1929); Costigan, "Those Protective Trusts Which are Miscalled 'Spendthrift
Trusts' Reexamined," 22 CAL. L. REv. 471 (1935); 34 MicH. L. REV. 736 (1936).
26
Exemptions have not always been allowed. BucKLAND, A TEXT-BooK OF
RoMAN LAw, 2d ed., 608 (1932); SoHM, INSTITUTES OF RoMAN PRIVATE LAw,
3d ed., Ledlie trans., 286-287 (1907); Chandler v. Horne, 23 Ohio App. 1, 154 N. E.
748 (1926). Wage garnishment exemptions were first provided for in Michigan in
1849. Mich. Laws (1849), No. 137, § 2. In 1930, however, the following plaint was
recorded: "So deeply ingrained in the body politic as a natural right is the theory of
exemptions, that legislatures are willing to keep on the statute books, laws which admittedly do great injustice to creditors, and courts in many cases tend to give a liberal
construction to those laws or constitutional provisions if, as is often the case, exemptions
are named in the state constitution." CREDIT MANUAL OF CoMMERCIAL LAws 48
(1930). See generally, NUGENT, WAGE EXECUTIONS FOR DEBT 8 (1936) (U.S. Dept.
Labor, Bull. No. 622).
21
For instance, in Flint, Michigan, early in 1939, a married man with three
children, working in one of the automobile plants and employed full time, would
receive approximately $160 in wages for four weeks at the average wage paid for work
weeks of forty hours each. If he were garnished each week by his creditors, which is
by no means uncommon, he could claim exemptions each week to the amount of $15,
the maximum under the present Michigan garnishment-exemption statute. Yet, at the
same time the Genesee County Welfare Agency, in which county Flint is located,
estimated that the average family of five in Flint would require approximately seventytwo dollars a month for minimum subsistence. And the food provided for by such a
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object of any exemption statute should be to give to the creditor all
that the debtor can pay from his earnings, and other property if he has
any short of the poetic pound of flesh, while at the same time protecting
the debtor and his family from want, or taking from him so much that
at the first break of employment he becomes a relief client.28 A satisfactory procedure for settling these problems must, therefore, be flexible enough to conform to each individual case. To be so conformable
it can scarcely be solidified in statutory form and still be satisfactory.

B.

Efficacy of Orthodox Methods

Accurate statistics for the country in general with reference to the
number and money value of judgments rendered when compared to
the number and money value of judgments satisfied are lacking. Some
idea of how the present system was working in 1930, however, may
be gleaned from recorded experience in New York.
Research there showed that of the judgments rendered in the
Supreme Court of New York County during 1930, only r7.r3 percent
in number or 6. 72 per cent in amount, were marked paid or satisfied. 29
While many may have been paid and an entry of satisfaction not recorded, the researchers for the Commission on the Administration of
Justice in New York State reached the conclusion that the
"experience of the legal profession in this state during the past
ten years shows that at least seventy-five per cent of the money
judgments rendered by our courts are never paid. This condition
antedates the current economic depression and cannot be attributed
to it. Nor can it be explained by the theory that seventy-five per
cent of the persons against whom judgments have been awarded
during the past ten years have not had the money or property to
budget would, to quote a social worker in that agency, not be sufficient to make one
fat. Such minimum subsistence budget would include nothing for insurance, medical
care, entertainment, or any other such expenses which continually present themselves.
The exemptions would be the same whether all three children were infants in arms or
in high school. In fact, the number of children has nothing to do with the amount of
garnishment exemptions in most states. If the debtor had been out of work for some
time and had just returned to work, the result is the same. If he worked part time and
earned, say $15 a week, the creditor could reach $6 of it, leaving the debtor $9 upon
which to support five persons a week. A statute based upon such unreality can cause complaint from the debtor as well as from the creditor. It is a simple statute for administrative purposes, but its re~ults would hardly seem socially desirable.
28
Dennis v. Smith, 125 Ohio St. 120, 180 N. E. 638 (1932).
29
REPORT OF THE CoMMISSION ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN NEW
YoRK STATE, Part F, p. 6 (Leg. Doc. No. 50, 1934).
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satisfy them. This is patently improbable. The condition described
has arisen because our antequated [sic] machinery for the enforcement of money judgments is practically useless under modern
conditions. Our procedure in this connection has not kept pace with
the times. The writer is of the opinion that on at least two-thirds
of the judgments unpaid, the judgment debtors could pay if they
wished to. But adequate machinery to compel them to do so does
not exist." 80
For some time business men have recognized that the adjustment
of credit problems between themselves and their debtors is as much
a matter of business and economics as it is of law. 81 Resort to legal
process must be had, however, when one encounters a recalcitrant
debtor, or for self-protection when other creditors who are over-diligent
harass the debtor, but debtors are not all or always recalcitrant when
creditors cooperate with them. To avoid court proceedings as a collection method with attendant costs and delays, merchants have banded
together to provide methods for amortization of their debtor's obligations through voluntary pooling arrangements. Many of these plans are
operated through retail merchants' credit associations or collection
agencies. 82 They require the one hundred per cent cooperation of creditors and the debtor. One non-consenting creditor can upset the plan
through the issuance of wage garnishments. It seems safe to say that
this method of amortization is an expression of displeasure with present
legal collection methods.
To remedy the defects in judgment collection methods--defects
which should be apparent to anyone familiar with the orthodox procedure in courts handling small debtor cases-the method of instalment
payment of judgments has been devised in an attempt to make collection procedure conform in some manner to the methods by which
modern business is carried on.
80

Id. See also SECOND REPORT

OF

THE Ju01c1AL CouNCIL

OF

NEw YoRK 13

(1936).
81

Brentano, "A New Way to Pay Old Debts," 21 I SATURDAY EvENING PoST
(March 18, 1939), p. 23; Alexander, "The Man Who Answers Telephones," 15
NEW YoRKER, (April 22, 1939), p. 21, condensed in 34 READER'S DIGEST (June,
1939), p. 81. See also Billig, "What Price Bankruptcy: A Plea for 'Friendly Adjustment,'" 14 CoRN. L. Q. 413 (1929); Billig, "Extra-judicial Administration of Insolvent Estates: A Study of Recent Cases," 78 UN1v. PA. L. REv. 293 (1930); Gamer,
"On Comparing 'Friendly Adjustment' and Bankruptcy," 16 CoRN. L. Q. 35 (1930).
32
See Brentano, "A New Way to Pay Old Debts," 21 l SATURDAY EvENING PosT,
(March 18, 1939), p. 23.
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II
STATUTES FOR INSTALMENT PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS

The :first statute providing for the instalment payment of judgments had its origin in the Debtor's Act of 1869 in England.33 It was
one of the remedies provided to relieve the plight of the unfortunate
debtor in England during the middle of the past century. The principal purpose of the statute was to abolish imprisonment for debt. 8'
Today these statutes are generally of two types with reference to
procedure. With reference to ends, they are similar. The :first type may
be called an instalment execution statute and is exemplified by section
684 of the New York Civil PracticeAct.85 This is process supplementary
to execution in the nature of a third party order requiring the employer
of the debtor to pay at regular intervals a stated sum, usually expressed
in percentages, out of the wages of the judgment debtor. Such garnishment or third party order constitutes a continuing lien upon the wages
to be earned in the future and obviates the necessity of suing out a new
order for each succeeding payday. New Jersey has a statute of similar
import.86
The second type of statute may be called an instalment order statute
and provides for an order of a court, supplementary to judgment ( not
to execution) as a general rule, whereby the judgment debtor is summoned for an examination and once his economic status and social responsibility with reference to his family and their needs, plus his own
33

32 & 33 Viet., c. 62 (1869).
Another reason might have been the desire to improve collection procedure, in
view of the following statement: "From October 1, 1838 to December 1, 1839 (a
period of fourteen months} 3,905 persons were arrested for debt in London and the
provinces, and of these 361 remained permanently in gaol for default of payment or
satisfaction. Out of the 3,905 debtors so arrested, dividends were obtained in 199 cases
only. The debt9r who was left in durance vile shared a common prison with the mu_rderer and the thief, and the spectacle of misfortune linked in this manner to the side
of crime was as demoralizing as it was cruel." Bowen, "Progress in the Administration
of Justice During the Victorian Period," I SELECT EssAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
HrsTORY 516 at 544 (1907).
35
Not to be overlooked are those statutes of limited scope providing for the payment of judgments in instalments, such as the Soldier's and Sailor's Civil Relief Act
of 1918, 40 Stat. L. 440 at 442, § 204 (1918), 50 U.S. C. A. (Supp. 1940), § u5,
which is made effective for persons in military and naval service under the Selective
Training and Service Act of 1940, Pub. No. 783, 50 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1940), §
3 I 3, and special provisions of statutes relating to the financial responsibility of operators of motor vehicles, Ohio Gen. Code ( I 940), § 6298-2.
36
1 N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937), §§ 2:26-182, 2:26-183, 2:32-180 to 2:32-183.
34
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needs, are determined, the court issues an order to him requiring him
to pay to the court or to the judgment creditor directly a specified sum
at stated intervals. 81 It is in reality an in personam order similar to an
equitable decree.
While the statutes differ in their sanctions, they usually provide
that the judgment debtor may be committed to jail for contempt if he
wilfully refuses or negligently fails to pay when he is able. Or they
provide for no sanction, but either by specific provision or general practice, when the judgment debtor violates the instalment order, provide
for its rescission by the court issuing it. This is usually upon application
of the judgment creditor, and once again the judgment debtor is subject to all the pains, inconveniences, and costs of repeated garnishments.

A.

Instalment Execution Statutes

The New York statute 88 requires that an execution previously issued
must be returned partly or wholly unsatisfied before an instalment
execution order against the wages, debts, earnings, salary, income from
trust funds or profits may issue. The New Jersey statute does not make
this requirement. 89 In New York if the judgment debtor's wages,
earnings or income is $ I 2 or more a week, the court may issue a third
party order to the employer or the debtor of the judgment debtor to
pay over to the court a maximum of ten per cent of such income. 40
In New Jersey, if the income of the judgment debtor is $18 or more
a week but does not exceed $IOOO per year, the instalment order may
be for a maximum of ten per cent, and if the judgment debtor's income
exceeds $ IOOO a year the judge of the court from which the execution
issued may set the amount to be paid on the execution.41 The instalment
execution, which in reality is a garnishment, becomes a "lien and continuing levy" upon such specified income of the judgment debtor until the
judgment debt and costs are paid in full. If a number of executions have
87
E. g., 1 N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937), §§ 2:26-163, 2:26-181, 2:32-179; N. Y.
Civ. Prac. Act (1937), § 793; R. I. Gen. Laws (1923), c. 354, § 1, R. I. Gen.
Laws (1938), c. 555; Mich. Pub. Acts (1935), No. 106, 22 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1938),
§§ 27.1481 et seq.; 2 Mass. Gen. Laws (Ter. Ed. 1932), c. 224, § 16; Conn. Gen.
Stat. (Supp. 1937), § 846d.
88
N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act (1937), § 684. See Newman and Kaufman, "The New
York Garnishee Execution as a Practical Remedy," 12 N. Y. UNiv. L. Q. REv. 255
(1934).
89
Russell v. Mechanics' Realty Co., 88 N. J. L. 532, 96 A. 657 (1916).
¾ON. Y. Civ. Prac. Act (1937), § 684 (1).
n IN. J. Rev. Stat. (1937), §§ 2:26-182, 2:26-183, 2:32-180, 2:32-181.
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been issued, only one can be in effect at one time. They acquire priority
in the order in which they are served upon the debtor of the judgment
debtor, thus carrying over the common-law rule for giving preference
to insistent creditors on a "first come, first paid" basis into this new type
of garnishment process.42 Upon application by either party, the court
may modify the terms of the instalment execution order to inake it conform to new facts that may exist at the time the modification is sought.
The New York statute provides, further, that such instalment execution
orders may be issued against the wages of municipal employees, employees of boards of education, and state officers and employees.43
Execution orders under these statutes may be made without notice
to the judgment debtor, but the application for the order must be supported by affidavits or other proof satisfactory to the court. 44 The evidence must be "competent," that is, evidence which would be admissible
in a court of law. It would seem that if a judgment debtor knew of such
application being made against him he could come in if he wished and
be heard, for he is given express permission to come in after the instalment execution order has issued against his wages or income and ask
for a modification of it. After an order is made, if the employer or
debtor of the judgment debtor fails or refuses to make payment according to the teno.r of the order, the judgment creditor may proceed
against either,4 5 and in a proper case secure a summary judgment.46
So long as proceedings under this type of statute are execution
proceedings, the payment of the money must be made to the sheriff,
accounted for by him and then paid by him to the judgment creditor.47
This mode of procedure entails costs, added bookkeeping in the office
of the sheriff and the clerk of the courts, and, while originally the costs
and fees are subtracted from the sum which goes to the judgment creditor, eventually they are paid by the judgment debtor.
While these statutes are an advancement over the old type of garnishment proceedings against wages and income. due a judgment debtor,
they are still burdened with costs and fees for an act ( the issuance of a
N. Y. Civ. Prac Act (1937), § 684 (1); 1 N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937), §
2:26-184.
43
N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act (1937), § 684 (6), (8).
H Varbalow v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 125 N. J. L. 147, 14 A. (2d) 548
(1940).
45
l N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937), §§ 2:32-183, 2:26-186; Credit Adjusters & Col•
lectors v. Bergen Essex Const. Co., (N. J. S. Ct. 1940) II A. (2d) 755; Sobel v.
Sobel, 249 App. Div. 647, 291 N. Y. S. 4 (1936).
46
Rosenberg v. Parlay Hats, Inc., 144 Misc. 519, 258 N. Y. S. 949 (1932).
41
N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act (1937), § 685.
42
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previous execution returned unsatisfied in whole or in part ' 8 ) that
may be known to be vain from the beginning. Repeated garnishment
costs are saved, however, for these statutes have the advantage of
allowing a single execution order to continue, effective against future
earnings, until the debt and court costs are paid, or until the judgment
debtor loses his job or seeks refuge in bankruptcy.
These instalment execution statutes, being in derogation of the
common-law rule concerning garnishment of claims accruing in the
future, are strictly construed by the courts. Therefore, a judgment
creditor must follow their provisions closely in order to have a valid
instalment execution order issue, and the court must make its order
conform to the statute or it will be ineffective. These points were clearly
made in Trapp v. Brown,49 a case wherein P secured a judgment against
D for $7 IO and costs. Execution was returned unsatisfied. P then
petitioned the court for an instalment execution order to issue against
rents which D received as owner and lessor of a hotel building in Atlantic City. The order was granted and D moved to vacate it. The
supreme court vacated the order on two grounds: (I) The statute allowed such an order to issue to reach "wages, debts, earnings, salary,
income from trust funds, or profits." It did not mention "real estate of
the debtor, or rents therefrom, which terms at all times have borne
a distinctive legal status and characteristic.... It will be presumed,
therefore, that ... its omission ... was due to an intent to eliminate it
from the purview of the act." 50 (2) No reason was shown why execution could not issue against D's building in Atlantic City. This was
affirmed, on appeal, on the ground that the court below had not made
a valid instalment execution order because of an omission to state the
percentage of the rent to be taken. While one might infer that the
court of errors and appeals would have allowed an instalment execution
order to issue against rents, it is clear that both courts adopted the rule
of strict construction despite the fact that these are remedial statutes.
The court of errors and appeals stated:
"The statute is in derogation of the common law rights of the
debtor. It takes from him, without notice, and without a hearing,
property which, except for the statute, is exempt from execution.
It is, therefore, necessary for the creditor and the court in attempt48
•

9

Hayward v. Hayward, 178 App. Div. 92, 164 N. Y. S. 877 (1917).
91 N. J. L. 481, 104 A. 302 (1918), construing N. J. Laws (1916), p. 242,

c. 113.
110

Id., 91 N.

J.

L. at 485.
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ing to enforce the right given by the statute to follow its provisions
strictly." 51
The statute applies both to judgments for the recovery of money
and to decrees in equity for the payment of money. In a divorce case
where a court decreed to the wife her divorce, and in the decree allowed
attorney's fees plus costs in the case, it was held proper to issue an instalment execution order against the former husband's wages of more
than $30 a week providing that twenty per cent o.f his wages be paid
on the attorney's fee and the court costs of the divorce case. 52 Obviously,
such an instalment execution order could issue if alimony were ordered
paid in a lump sum. Such an order might be a welcome escape from
continual resort to contempt proceedings if a divorced husband continually failed or refused to pay alimony at periodic intervals as ordered
by the court. Where alimony is payable in instalments, the only sanction for wilful or negligent failure to pay where the former spouse
is able to pay is by contempt proceedings-which net the divorced wife
no financial solace and oftentimes lead to the loss of employment by
the erstwhile husband. If the divorced spouse can be kept at work free
from contempt citations and at the same time a portion of his wages
diverted to the alimony decree, an economic gain to all the parties
would seem apparent.
It is obvious in the application of these instalment execution statutes
that what was otherwise exempt income without their aid is still exempt.
Hence, if a widow is receiving insurance upon the life of her deceased
husband 53 or an injured workman is receiving industrial compensation
at regular intervals,54 such income cannot be reached by the issuance of
an instalment execution order.

B. Instalment Order Statutes
r. English and Canadian Statutes
The English statute of 1869 may be applied in all English courts.
Unless abrogated by provincial statute, it is also applied in those Canadian provinces which derive their law from the English statutes or
Trapp v. Brown, 93 N. J. L. 171 at 173, 107 A. 413 (1919).
White v. White, 94 N. J. Eq. 278, 120 A. 419 (1923).
53
Crossman Co~ v. Rauch, 263 N. Y. 264, 188 N. E. 748 (1934).
54
Surace v. Danna, 248 N. Y. 18, 161 N. E. 315 (1928). The salary of a
judge of a district court in New Jersey was reached by an instalment execution order
under this type of statute. Cross v. LaCorte, (N. J. S. Ct. 1933) 168 A. 849. And
the salary of a municipal officer likewise. Petersen v. Jersey City, 89 N. J. L. 93, 97
A. 963 (1916). These salaries were not exempt from garnishment proceedings in
New Jersey.
51
52
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from the common law of 1869 or a later date. 55 By its express provisions it does not apply to Ireland and Scotland. 56 It is short, the
gist of it as follows: "any court may direct any debt due from any
person in pursuance of any order or judgment of that or any other
competent court to be paid by instalments, and may from time to
time rescind or vary such order." 51 The County Courts Act of 1934
confers similar authority expressly on the judges of the county courts. 58
The procedure for securing an instalment order is governed by court
rule and the general practice which has grown up around the statute. 50
As previously mentioned, the statute of 1869 was intended in part
to prevent imprisonment for debt. Excepted from the proscription of
imprisonment for debt is the situation where a debtor has had ·a judgment rendered against him and having, or having had since the date of
the judgment, the means to pay he refuses or negligently fails to
pay. 60 In such case, the judgment creditor may have a judgment
summons issued against the debtor looking forward to a committal order
from the court committing the req1lcitrant debtor to jail for nonpayment. On a hearing on the summons, the judge may make a committal
order if he wishes, provided the evidence shows that the debtor did
not pay when he could pay, or he may make an order that the judgment
debtor make instalment payments at stated intervals. It is obvious that
the judge should hear some evidence on the debtor's financial circumstances, but there is no requirement that he must. 61 However, before
he can commit a debtor for nonpayment of any instalment, he must
find that the debtor has failed to make payments and also determine
that the debtor is able to pay. After the instalment order has been
issued, if there be a default in the payment of one instalment, a committal order may issue at the instance of the judgment creditor. But
the court will not order committal unless it is made to appear to his
satisfaction that the judgment debtor had, or has at the date of the
committal order, sufficient means to pay the instalment. The probable
future income of the debtor has nothing to do with respect to the com55 Bateman v. Svenson, 18 Manitoba 493 (1909); Greenshields & Co., Ltd. v.
Reeves, 15 Brit. Colum. 19 (1909); cf. Royal Bank of Canada v. McLennan, 25
Brit. Colum. 183 (1917).
56
32 & 33 Viet., c. 62, § 2 (1869). But this system is in effect in Ireland. Governor and Company of the Bank of Scotland v. Cunningham, [1899] 2 Irish Rep. 780.
51
32 & 33 Viet., c. 62, § 5 (2) (1869).
58
County Courts Act of 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. V, c. 53, § 96 (1934).
59
ln Re a Judgment Debtor, 51 T. L. R. 524 (1935); Queen v. Judge of
Brompton County Court, 18 Q. B. D. 213 (1886).
00
32 & 33 Viet., c. 62, § 5 (2) (1869).
61
Dillon v. Cunningh;im, L. R. 8 Ex. 23 (1872).
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mittal order. With respect to the instalment order itself, the probable
future income of the debtor has to be considered carefully in adjusting
the instalment payments. 62 This seems logical and practical, as it would
be vain to set a high instalment payment which the judgment debtor
could not pay, only to have him haled into court on a committal order,
for upon investigation into his financial circumstances to determine
whether he should be committed for contempt the judge would decide
that he did not have sufficient means to make the payment, refuse
to make the commitment, and issue a modification of the instalment
order previously entered.
If a debtor is committed it is the practice of the court, while the
commitment is in force, to suspend the operation of the instalment
order on the theory that the income of the debtor over the committal
period will be used in making up the instalment arrears. It is recognized, as a practical matter, that the debtor is not likely to have, during
the committal period, any income available to meet instalments subsequent in due date to those in respec;_t of which he has been committed.68
An English court is without power to issue an instalment order and
in the same instalment order insert a provision that for nonpayment of
any instalment the debtor is to be committed for the nonpayment.
When such a situation did arise, the English Court of Appeals said:
"The jurisdiction given by the Debtors Act, 1869, is in favour
of the liberty of the subject and in restraint of imprisonment....
Looking at the present case, we see the mischief which might arise
were such a practice to prevail; an order might be made upon a
debtor for payment by four monthly instalments, and after having
paid the first two he might be unable to pay the third instalment
through want of means; still the order of committal stands against
him, and he must go to prison. But if he had the opportunity
( as he ought to have) of again going before the judge to shew his
inability to pay that instalment, no committal order would be made
against him. This, it is obvious, would be a most serious mischief.
. . . this practice is a plain evasion of the Act ... and deprives the
debtor of that protection which has been so carefully provided for
him." 64
The general practice above outlined is followed in the county
62

Stonor v. Fowle, 13 A. C. 20 at 24 {1887).
In Re a Judgment Debtor, 51 T. L. R. 524 (1935).
64
Queen v. Judge of Brompton County Court, 18 Q. B. D. 213 at 220, 221
{1886); reversed in the House of Lords, sub nom., Stonor v. Fowle, 13 A. C. 20
{ l 887), on the facts, but approving the statements of law made by the court of appeals.
County Courts Act of 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. V, c. 53, § II7 (1934).
68
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courts where authority is specifically conferred upon a county court
judge to discharge a prisoner from prison for nonpayment of an instalment due on a judgment where the debtor is unable from any cause to
pay the instalment. 65 The discharge may be upon terms if the court
thinks proper.
Where a judgment has been ordered to be paid in instalments, the
court may order the instalments paid into court or directly by one
party to the other. 66
Statutes somewhat similar in terms and providing somewhat the
same method of procedure are in effect in some of the provinces in
Canada. 67 They provide generally that the judgment creditor set in
motion the judicial machinery for discovery or proceedings in aid of
execution, that the court may make the instalment order having due
regard for the property and income of the debtor, as well as other debts
owed by such debtor, and the amount required for the support of his
family or those dependent upon him for their support, and that for an
inexcusable noncompliance with the order, the debtor may be committed as for contempt of court.
It should be noted that, while the English statutes are supplementary to execution in a certain sense in that previous orders must have
issued before the instalment order can be secured, they nevertheless
differ from the provisions in the instalment execution orders issued in
this country in that the order to pay in instalments is issued directly to
the judgment debtor himself, and not to his employer or to the source of
his income. The Rhode Island statute expressly makes the return of an
unsatisfied execution a jurisdictional basis of the issuance of an instalment order. 68
2.

State Instalment Order Statutes

Statutes providing for this method of payment of judgments have
been in effect in small claim's courts for some time. 60 Usually in such
65

County Courts Act of 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. V, c. 53, §§ 142, 143 (5) (1934).
Id., § 96.
61
2 New Brunswick Rev. Stat. (1927), c'. 134, § 53; 2 Nova Scotia Rev. Stat.
(1923), c. 232, § 29; I Saskatchewan Rev. Stat. (1930), c. 49, § 54; Re Caledonia
Milling Co. v. Johns, 42 Ont. L. Rep. 338 (1918); Royal Bank of Canada v. McLennan, 25 Brit. Colum. 183 (1917); Royal Bank v. Diamond, 38, Man. 585, [1930]
3 Dom. L. Rep. 8 Io.
68
Morris Plan Co. of Rhode Island v. Katz, 57 R. I. 495, 190 A. 455 (1937).
69
Minn. Laws (1917), c. 263 (Minneapolis); I Minn. Rev. Stat. (Mason,
1927), §§ 1377, 1380 (a); Minn. Laws (Ex. Sess. 1937), c. 67, § 5 (Duluth);
Kan. Gen. Stat. (1935), §§ 20-1301, 20-1307.
66
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courts the judgment itself contains the provision that the debtor be
required to make payments of a specified amount at stated intervals.
Normally these are judgments from conciliation courts, or conciliation
divisions of municipal courts. While some states have had statutes of
this type for some twenty-five years, it is only within the past decade
that much attention has been paid to this device to aid in the collection
of judgments in courts of more general jurisdiction. Following the
example of England and Canada, statutes of this type have been
enacted in several states for use in courts of more general jurisdiction. 70
Being in derogation of the common law in that they substitute an order
in personam for a property execution, they are strictly construed. 71
a.

New York Statutes
72

The New York statute deserves close analysis. Enacted in 1935,
it is probably the most comprehensive, due to the varied situations
which were found to exist in the metropolitan areas of New York by the
survey of the Commission on the Administration of Justice in New
York, and to the various methods revealed to the courts by which
judgment debtors sought to escape garnishment process directed toward
their property, wages, or income.
It provides, in brief, that the court may order a judgment debtor
to pay the judgment creditor, presumably in full, or to apply on the
judgment, in instalments, such portion of his income "however or
whenever earned or acquired" as the judge may direct, after due regard
for the requirements of the judgment debtor and his family, if the
family be dependent upon him. Regard must also be exercised for other
instalment order payments which the debtor has to make to other judgment creditors. If the debtor is rendering services to a relative, or
working for a company or corporation owned or controlled by a relative or other person, at a salary so small as to be colorable or entirely
inadequate for the work performed, and this situation appears due to
a design to hinder or defraud the creditors of the judgment debtor,
7
°Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1937), § 846d; La. Acts (1938), No. 126, § 4
(expiring at 12 o'clock noon on the twentieth day after the adjournment of the
regular session of the legislature for the year 1940); 2 Mass. Gen. Laws (Ter. Ed.
1932), c. 224, § 16; Mich. Pub. Acts (1935), No. 106, 22 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1938),
§ 27.1481 et seq.; I N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937), §§ 2:26-163, 2:26-181, 2:32-179;
N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act (1937), § 793; R. I. Gen. Laws (1938), c. 555.
71
·
Morris Plan Co. of Rhode Island v. Katz, 57 R. I. 495, 190 A. 455 (1937);
Berkowitz v. First District Court of Jersey City, 108 N. J. L. 345, 156 A. 666 (1931).
72
N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act (1937), § 793.
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the court may conduct a hearing and set a reasonable value upon the
services so rendered and make the instalment order with reference to
that value. This statute carried no sanction with it,73 a deficiency which
was remedied in 1937 when there was added to the act by amendment
the following sentence: "A failure or neglect to comply with an order
or direction of the court, authorized by this section, shall constitute a
contempt, punishable civilly, in accordance with article nineteen of the
judiciary law." 74
It will be noted that the proceedings to secure an instalment order
under this act are necessarily set in motion by the judgment creditor.
In practice he applies by motion to the proper court, supported by
affidavit or evidence known to the party making the statement showing
the amount of the judgment, that it is unpaid, the amount of the debtor's income, or the reasonable value of his services or earning ability,
the size of his family, and other information upon which the court may
base its decision as to the wisdom of issuing an instalment order and the
amount to be specified in the order if one is issued. 75 There is authority
73 Diamond & Frazer Iron Works, Inc. v. Di Tullio, l 57 Misc. 801, 284 N. Y. S.
658 (1935); but compare Compton v. Williams, 248 App. Div. 545, 290 N. Y. S.
984 (1936).
74
N. Y. Laws (1937), c. 586, N. Y. Civ. Proc. Act (1937), § 793. A judgment
debtor who is paying the judgment in instalments may cease payments upon his adjudication in bankruptcy and before a discharge is granted to him. In re Brecher, (D. C.
N. Y. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 283. In the wage garnishment cases where a judgment debtor
goes into bankruptcy, the employer is usually restrained from paying over to the creditor
any portion of the bankrupt's wages after the adjudication, but he is required to make the
proper deductions and cumulate them pending the discharge of the bankrupt. If the
discharge is not granted, the cumulated funds are paid to the creditor. If the discharge
is granted, they are paid to the judgment debtor. In re Kunsman, (D. C. N. Y. 1938)
24 F. Supp. 583. But an instalment order is different from a wage garnishment, for if
the debtor paid the instalments to the judgment creditor and later secured his discharge, the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act would be violated. Further, the federal
court, sitting in bankruptcy, has no authority to rewrite the instalment order of the
state court to require the debtor to pay a third person who would hold the money in
escrow pending the outcome of the bankruptcy proceedings. In re Brecher, supra.
The instalment order may be enforced up to the date of the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy, and the failure to make payments up to that date without cause being
shown may be punished for a contempt. Morris Plan Co. of N.-Y. v. Shear, 164 Misc.
712, 299 N. Y. S. 475 (1937); S.S. & B. Live Poultry Corp. v. Fleischer, 165 Misc.
175, 300 N. Y. S. 617 (1937).
75
Adirondack Furniture Corp. v. Crannell, 167 Misc. 599, 5 N. Y. S. (2d)
840 (1938). In New Jersey a show cause order must first issue before a district court
has power to issue an instalment order. l N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937), § 2:32-179; Berkowitz v. First District Court of Jersey City, 108 N. J. L. 345, 156 A. 666 (1931). The
same would seem to be true in the other courts in New Jersey. l N. J. Rev. Stat.
(1937), § 2:26-181. But if circumstances are disclosed on proceedings for discovery
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that the courts have discretion in issuing instalment orders, and that an
instalment order should not issue if there are no prior wage garnishments outstanding and a garnishment execution would do as well. 76
This decision was based upon three premises: (I) That the evil aimed
at was to circumvent prior illegal garnishments, and to require a debtor
who earned a large salary to pay to his creditors who were junior to a
prior garnishing creditor whatever amount he could pay. ( 2) That the
judgment creditor be given speedier and more effective relief against
judgment debtors who were working for relatives at a colorable salary,
or ostensibly for no salary at all. (3) That to grant an instalment order
in every case, without consideration of the above two reasons would be
to enforce every money judgment by an in personam decree, with possible contempt proceedings following for any failure to comply with
such instalment order. It is questionable whether the issuance of an
instalment order should be so circumscribed, and some subsequent cases
do not indicate that it has been. 7 7
The New York statute does not expressly prohibit wage garnishments by the same creditor while an instalment order is outstanding in
his favor, but by implication the prohibition would appear to be there,
for the judge orders the judgment debtor to pay all that he can pay
consistent with his social responsibilities. This the debtor could not do
if his wages were subject to a further deduction by virtue of an instalment execution order. Moreover, it would appear that wage garnishment and an instalment order are mutually exclusive, and resort to one
should bar resort to the other. 78 This does not prevent judgment creditor A from seeking an instalment order directed to his judgment debtor
merely because judgment creditor B is already receiving instalment
payments directly from their common judgment debtor or is receiving
instalment execution payments from the employer of the common
judgment debtor. The Connecticut statute expressly voids all wage
garnishments. 7°
in aid of execution which would warrant the issuance of an instalment order, the court
would seem to have power to issue it at once. l N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937), § 2:26-163.
76
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Zaroff, 157 Misc. 796, 284 N. Y. S. 665
(1935); Dibner v. Cousminer, 157 Misc. 229, 283 N. Y. S. 369 (1935).
11
Compare Economy Leases, Inc. v. Bierman, 159 Misc. 367, 286 N. Y. S. 732
(1936).
78
McDonnell v. McDonnell, 281 N. Y. 480, 24 N. E. (2d) 134 (1939).
79
Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1937), § 846d (a); James, "The Collection of Money
Judgments in Connecticut: An Analysis with Proposals," 14 CoNN. B. J. 3, 91 at 94
(1940).
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The contempt sanction should be sufficient compulsion to make the
debtor refrain from wilfully violating the instalment order. Such sanction is also found in the Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island
statutes. 80 Commitment under such sanction does not operate as a payment of the obligation.81 Further commitment for nonpayment under
this act does not, in legal theory, constitute imprisonment for debt.
It is merely imprisonment for wilfully disobeying an order of the court
with which the judgment debtor had the ability and the means to comply. 82
b. Michigan Statutes
In Detroit, Michigan, during 1932, the plight of wage-earner
debtors was acute. Work in the motor industry was seasonal, debts
piled up during periods of 'unemployment, and when employment
was resumed, wage garnishments would increase manyfold.83 The
same situation existed in Flint. 8 Wage garnishment exemptions under
the Michigan statute are inadequate where the debtor has a family and
resides in a city, so there was slight incentive for a debt-ridden debtor
to work. To curb somewhat the excessive use of wage garnishments,
the conciliation division of the Detroit Common Pleas Court, in reality
a municipal court, attempted to secure agreements from debtors to
make stated payments on their judgments and to get creditors to accept
those payments and forego wage garnishments against the debtor so
long as he continued his payments. A similar practice was followed in
the court of the justices of the peace in Hamtramck, a suburb of Detroit
but an independent political unit. 85 This voluntary system was continued until Michigan in 1933 enacted its first statute providing for
instalment payment of judgments.86
4,

8
°Cited supra, note 70. Because a corporation cannot be imprisoned for debt, an
instalment order will not be issued against a corporate debtor in Massachusetts. Huntley
Furniture Co. v. Parker, 291 Mass. 339, 196 N. E. 925 (1935). See also McDermott
v. Bryer, (C. C. A. 1st, 1933) 62 F. (2d) 297.
81
R. I. Gen. Laws (1938), c. 555, § 2.
82
Compton Co. v. Williams, 248 App. Div. 545, 290 N. Y. S. 984 (1936);
Reeves v. Crownshield, 274 N. Y. 74, 8 N. E. (2d) 283 (1937).
88 Nugent, "Devices for Liquidating Small Claims in Detroit," 2 LAW & CoNTEM.
PROB. 259 (1935).
84
Woodbridge, "Wage Earners' Receiverships," NINTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
JUDICIAL CouNcIL OF M1cHIGAN 57 at 78 (1939); id., 23 J. AM. JuD. Soc. 242 at
250 (1940).
85
Nugent, "Devices for Liquidating Small Claims in Detroit," 2 LAW & CoNTEM.
PROB. 259 at 264 (1935).
86
Mich. Pub. Acts (1933), No. 125, 24 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1938), § 27.3669.
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The statute applies only in the Common Pleas Court of Detroit.
It differs somewhat from the New York and the English statutes in
several details. It provides, in effect, that after the judgment has
become final in the trial court, the court may, ( r) by written consent
of the parties, or ( 2) upon the written motion of a defendant or crossdefendant, and after a hearing at which the opposite party shall have
the opportunity to cross-examine the moving party as to all facts set
forth in the motion, order the judgment debtor to pay a specified sum
of money, weekly, biweekly, or monthly, to the clerk of the court to be
applied on the judgment. The judgment debtor who begins the proceeding must attach to his motion an affidavit showing that he is unable
to pay the judgment except from his wages, must show the name and
address of his employer, the amount of his wages and the date of their
payment. The amount of the receipts and disbursements in the case are
entered on the docket and file envelope of the case by the clerk. While
the debtor is complying with the instalment order no writ of garnishment can be sued out by the judgment creditor. But if the judgment
debtor misses a payment, the clerk of the court is empowered to enter
an order dismissing the instalment order, thus allowing writs of garnishment again to issue. While no provision specifically appears for
later modification of the order due to changed circumstances, it is
obvious that the court has such power upon later application of the
judgment debtor, supported by sufficient evidence to show that such
changed circumstances warrant a modification of the previous instalment
order.
The Michigan legislature in r933 also amended the statute relating
to the conciliation division of the Municipal Court of Flint, giving it
power to order instalment payments of judgments.87 The jurisdiction
of the conciliation division is limited in amount to cases not exceeding
$35. Besides providing for the typical consent conciliation judgment
which may include the payment of the judgment in instalments, the
statute expressly provides that the amount of instalments and times of
payment may, for good cause shown, be modified. It further proscribes
the writ of garnishment unless the court permits one to be issued.
With the background of experience gained in Detroit for a year
before the Detroit act was passed, with the experience since r 93 3 in both
Flint and Detroit, and with the experience gained in the Hamtramck
Justice of the Peace Court under informal agreements, the Michigan
87
Mich. Pub. Acts (1933), No. 269, § 51, 24 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1938), §
27.3881.
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legislature in 1935 enacted a state-wide statute which is more explicit
than either of the two limited statutes previously passed. 88
The procedure under the state-wide act is very similar to that
under the Detroit act, with the added express provision for modification
of the instalment order upon application by either party. 89 It further
allows the court to order the judgment debtor to make payment either
to the clerk of the court or to the judgment creditor directly. 0O This is
a wise provision, for at times much friction is avoided where judgment
creditors do not have to meet judgment debtors personally. In addition it is provided that the parties may make a written agreement
covering the instalment payment on the judgment, and upon being
filed with the court, the agreement has the same force as an order of
the court would have. 91 The act further specifically voids any writ
of wage garnishment issued without the consent of the judge or justice,
where there is an outstanding instalment order. 92 Obviously this provision means a wage garnishment issued by the judgment creditor who
is receiving the instalment payments on a present judgment. Although
a judgment creditor cannot resort to wage garnishment, he may if he
wishes have any other form of execution issued on the judgment.93
The statute of limitations is tolled on the judgment during the time
the instalment order is in force. 94
No express sanction is provided in the Michigan statute to be applied upon the failure of the debtor to pay. The closest approach to
a sanction is the power of the judgment creditor to cause a wage garnishment to issue if the judgment debtor misses a payment. Section
4 of the act provides that the instalment order shall stay the issuance
of any writ of garnishment for work and labor "during the period that
said defendant or cross-defendant complies with said order." 95 This
would seem to indicate clearly that the instalment order terminates upon
failure of the debtor to comply with its terms. Possibly the reason for
absence of a sanction such as power to cite for contempt for failure to
comply with an order within the ability of the debtor ( as under the
&s Mich. Pub. Acts (1935), No. 106, 22 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1938), § 27.1481.
Note, 6 DET. L. REv. 35 (1935).
89
22 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1938), § 27.1485.
90
Id., § 27.1484.
91
Id., § 27.1486.
02
Id., § 27.1487.
93
Id.,§ 27.1490.
9
¼ Id., § 27.1488.
95
Id., § 27.1484.
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English, Canadian, Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode Island acts)
is that this mode of enforcing a judgment is in reality an in personam
order peculiar to equity, and equitable powers are not ordinarily conferred upon justice of the peace and other inferior courts. A more
practical reason, and possibly a sounder one, would be that diligent
creditors, after a debtor has defaulted on an instalment order, will ·
cause repeated garnishments to issue against the judgment debtor's
wages, and this threat is considered a sufficient sanction.

3.

Experience Under Instalment Order Statutes
By its wording, the New York statute has reached much further
than would appear at first reading. It has effectively solved the problem of the fraudulent debtor who sets up a family corporation and
wo!ks for it at a small salary, or no salary at all, but whose wife or some
close relative draws a substantial salary for doing practically nothing. 96
The theory upon which the court can, after hearing, set an instalment
payment to be paid by the judgment debtor based upon a reasonabl;
value of the services rendered by the judgment debtor to the relative
or family corporation seems to be that of quasi-contract. So long as the
duty of the relative or the family corporation is not judicially determined as to him or it, the remedy is not so drastic as might be thought,
for the rights of such relative or family corporation are not decided by
the court in his or its absence. 97 The instalment order based upon such
valuation of services merely places the burden upon the fraudulent
debtor to cease his fraudulent practices. 98
A similar statute in Saskatchewan solved the problem of a fraudulent conveyance whereby the judgment debtor, after the judgment
creditor had secured a judgment against him, transferred his store
business to his wife, for and in consideration of seven years' work she had
performed for him. He also transferred to her a large farm under
cultivation. He wrote a letter about the debt to the plaintiff's lawyer
containing the following sent~nce: "They have no greenhorn to handle
in your humble servant, and when stepmother wrote me how ably you
were working for them I prepared my plans accordingly, and no earthly
96

Lackner v. Abrams, 160 Misc. 424, 289 N. Y. S: 1031 (1936); H. B. G.
Holding Corp. v. Patt, 164 Misc. 405, 299 N. Y. S. 49 (1937); Zeitlin v. Ballenzweig, 157 Misc. 219, 284 N. Y. S. 290 (1935).
97
But in Flapan v. Rosenblum, 119 Misc. 625, 196 N. Y. S. 892 (1922), on a
garnishment execution order the court allowed "implied earnings" for three years past
to be reached on the theory that they were due and unpaid.
98
H. B. G. Holding Corp. v. Patt, 164 Misc. 405, 299 N. Y. S. 49 (1937).
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power can get a dollar until I am jolly well ready to pay it." 99 The
court ordered him to pay $50 per month on the judgment. By this
method the long and troublesome process to have a fraudulent conveyance set aside, with its consequent delay and expense, was eliminated
and satisfaction obtained in a simple, informal, and inexpensive proceeding on the application for the instalment order.
The use of instalment orders directed to the debtor is greatly
preferable to garnishment process in the case of government employees.
Under the orthodox rule writs of garnishment cannot be issued to the
state or federal governments ·or their instrumentalities as garnishee defendants without their permission. Even as to governmental corporations, there is some confusion existing with reference to the construction
of statutory provisions in acts concerning the right to garnish the wages
of employees.
The act has been used to reach the salary of an employee of the
federal government in New York who refused to pay a judgment of
$400 when he was earning a salary of $230 a month, had no children,
and was not living with his wife nor paying anything for her support.100
Such a judgment debtor could not be garnished under the general rule
that salaries of federal employees are not subject to attachment or assignment unless the government gives its permission. He refused to pay
$20 per month as ordered until the judgment was satisfied and on
contempt proceedings was fined $20 and ordered committed until he
complied with the order of the court. On appeal he argued that this was
imprisonment for debt. The court said that imprisonment for debt was
not abolished by the Federal Constitution nor the state constitution of
New York and that the appellant was not denied due process of law.
The court said further that this was not imprisonment for debt, but for
the failure of the debtor to comply with an order of the court with
which he was able to comply and which he did not complain of as being
harsh, unjust, or inequitable. The court reasoned that while the salary
of governmental employees or officials is not subject to assignment and,
by implication, garnishment, once the money had been paid over to the
judgment debtor it became private property in his hands and there was
no legitimate reason why he could not be ordered to make payments on
the judgment, due regard being had for the needs of the judgment
99

Bell v. Long, 23 Sask. L. Rep. 130 (1928).

100

Reeves v. Crownshield, 274 N. Y. 74, 8 N. E. (2d) 283, I I I A. L. R.
389 at 392 (1937), noted 37 CoL. L. REv. 1216 (1937), 22 MINN. L. REv. 424
(1938), 5 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 305 (1938).
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debtor and his family. 101 This expression of the court, however, cannot
be carried to the extreme indicated. For instance, where a retired navy
captain was receiving $4,080 per year pension, the court refused to
issue an instalment order against him upon a judgment previously
rendered because, by another statute, a pension awarded by the government of the United States, or by a state, for military or naval services was exempt from seizure in legal proceedings.102
Again, the courts have held that instalment proceeds of insurance
policies on the life of the husband of the judgment debtor, which were
exempt from execution except on judgments for necessaries, are also
excepted from consideration in awarding an instalment order on a
judgment not for necessaries.1° 8
In another case involving a pension the judgment debtor was receiving $35 per month as a federal pension, and was employed by a
department of the federal government at a monthly salary of $90-a
total of $I25 per month. The judgment was for $r24.04. On an application for an instalment order, the court found that he required $93.50
per month for support of himself and family. The judgment debtor
claimed that his pension was totally exempt and that the salary of $90,
which was reachable by the instalment statute, was not sufficient upon
which to live. The court ordered him to pay $20 per month to the
judgment creditor or his attorney until the judgment was paid in full
or the order modified upon further proceedings, holding that the
pension was to be held free from the claims of his creditors only "to
insure him and his family a safe, although modest maintenance, so long
as their needs require it." 10" Hence, he should first apply the pension
to living expenses, and when that is done there is $3r.50 monthly left;
out of the latter sum, which is a portion of his salary and not the pension, he should make the monthly payment. The further fact that he
101 See also Bool Floral Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 158 Misc. 13, 284 N. Y. S. 960
(1936); Cross Bay Lumber Co., Inc., v. Samoa, 161 Misc. 458, 293 N. Y. S. 794
(1936); dissent of Boyd, J., in Governor and Company of the Bank of Scotland
v. Cunningham, [1899] 2 Irish Rep. 780.
102
Ley Realty Corp. v. Foley, 161 Misc. 666, 293 N. Y. S. 795 (1937).
103
Crossman Co. v. Rauch, 248 App. Div. 758, 288 N. Y. S. 827 (1936). The
same judgment creditor previously had made an unsuccessful attempt to reach the
monthly income received by the judgment debtor under the insurance policies in
question by resorting to an instalment execution order under § 684 of the Civil Practice
Act. Crossman Co. v. Rauch, 263 N. Y. 264, 188 N. E. 748 (1934); 40 N. Y. Consol.
Laws {McKinney, 1938), § 15.
104
Bowes v. Perkins, 169 Misc. 624, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 525 (1938).

1941

J

INSTALMENT JUDGMENTS

was a government employee did not give his wages any sanctity after
they had reached his hands.
In the alimony cases where the judgment debtor is receiving alimony for the support of herself and her children, there being no allocation made in the decree of the amounts for each purpose, the courts
refuse to make an instalment order against her, although alimony is
not necessarily exempt from creditors by reason of the fact that it is
alimony.105 The basis of such refusal is twofold: ( r) The alimony
decree can be modified only by the court issuing it, and .to make an
allocation of the amount for the children and for the wife would be
modifying the decree by another court. ( 2) If the order is issued based
on the alimony income of the debtor, the court may be taking money
properly belonging to the children for the debts of the mother, which
is obviously improper and illegal. 108 Dictum in one case indicates that
if a judgment debtor is receiving as alimony more than she needs for
her support, a judgment creditor might secure an instalment order
against such judgment debtor.107
The "fee man" can be reached also by this proceeding, while, as
previously pointed out, he cannot be touched by garnishment order in
the ordinary and typical case.
Acting upon the supposition that the statement in the act concerning income reached any income "however or whenever earned or acquired," one judgment creditor sought an order requiring a judgment
debtor, the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust, to make payments on a
judgment. The lower court held that it could consider the income from
the spendthrift trust with reference to the needs of the debtor beneficiary, and ordered the latter to make payments accordingly. 108 This
was reversed in the court of appeals on the ground that such order in
reality reached the income from the spendthrift trust without resort
105
Baskin & Co., Inc. v. Howe, 225 App. Div. 553, 233 N. Y. S. 648 (1929);
Rentall Realty Corp. v. Marksville, 170 Misc. 825, l l N. Y. S. (2d) 121 (1939);
Weingart v. Cohen, 159 Misc. 891, 289 N. Y. S. 9 (1936).
106
Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank v. Lehman, l 5 l Misc. 444, 270 N. Y. S.
589 (1933); Rentall Realty Corp. v. Marksville, 170 Misc. 825, 11 N. Y. S. (2d)
121 (1939).
107
Conlew, Inc. v. Thompson, 160 Misc. 551,289 N. Y. S. 862 (1936).
108
Kaplan v. Peyser, 247 App. Div. 660, 288 N. Y. S. 651 (1936). See also
GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRusTs, § 388, note 96 (1936); N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act
(1937), § 792.
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to the direct judicial proceeding to which the trustee is a necessary
party under the New York practice.109 The court said:
"Nothing in section 793 answers the question, 'In what condition
of life is a man entitled to be supported as against his creditors?'
... It has been difficult enough to deal with that matter in a judgment creditor's action. . .. If the Legislature intended to commit
such an issue in widespread fashion to courts having no equity
powers one may assume that the idea would not have been left to
doubtful implication. Again, if the time had come for so large a
revision of policy in respect of spendthrift trusts, the prohibition
against alienation of income by a beneficiary would hardly have
remained undisturbed." 110
Possibly an explicit statement in an amendment to section 793
to the effect that the income from a spendthrift trust could be ordered
used to make periodic payments on judgments, after this income had
re?,ched the hands of the beneficiary and after the court had considered
the needs of the beneficiary and his family, if dependent upon him,
would be sufficient expression of legislative policy to make such an act
effective for this purpose. If the legislature may recognize the validity
of a spendthrift trust, certainly it could take this means to allow creditors to reach the income after it had come into the hands of the beneficiary.
While other forms of execution against wages are subject to the
wage exemption statutes, the typical instalment order statute is not
so circumscribed. This increases its efficacy, giving leeway to a socially
minded judge to make the order fit the particular case before him.
It would seem also that when this proceeding is resorted to, the wage
exemption statute is actually abrogated. For instance, in New York
where a judgment creditor can reach through execution proceedings a
maximum of ten per cent of the wages of a debtor,m one judgment
debtor who was drawing $ 50 per week from a business in which his
wife was also interested and drawing $ IOO per week was ordered to pay
$12.50 per week.112 One case indicates payments of $20 per month out
of an income of $230.113 In another case where the debtor had an income
109

Kaplan v. Peyser, 273 N. Y. 147, 7 N. E. (2d) 21 (1937).
Id., 273 N. Y. 147 at 151.
111
N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act (1937), § 684.
112
Economy Leases v. Bierman, 159 Misc. 367, 286 N. Y. S. 732 (1936).
113
Reeves v. Crownshield, 274 N. Y. 74, 8 N. E. (2d) 283 (1937).
110
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of $46 per week, the original instalment order was $r.50, and on
motion the court raised it to $4.60 per week, exactly ten per cent.m
Due to the discretio!l lodged in the judge by the general wording
of the statutes concerning the needs of the debtor and his family in
setting the amount of each instalment payment, the success or failure
of judgment debtors in making their payments and thus avoiding more
garnishments in the future rests largely in the social outlook and
ingenuity of the judge in formulating rules, and his ability to analyze
individual cases with reference to actual human needs.
Different devices for ascertaiping the amounts of payments and
modes of procedure under the act are used in the various courts in
Michigan. In Hamtramck the payments are set as close to ten per cent
of the debtor's wages as possible. This is modelled after the procedure
used in the Detroit Common Pleas Court. If one judgment only is
involved, a straight. ten per cent of the debtor's wages is usually
ordered paid. If there are two judgments, both for non-necessaries or
both for necessaries, the usual payment is approximately :fifteen per
cent, split evenly between the two judgments. If there are two judgments, one for necessaries and one for non-necessaries, the same percentage of the debtor's wages are required to be paid in, but the necessary would be given sixty or seventy per cent of the amount realized
and the balance allocated to the non-necessary.
The procedure to secure an instalment order in Hamtramck is
uninvolved. The debtor signs a blank petition procured from the clerk
of the court. The typical petition merely recites that a judgment has
been rendered against the petitioner for the payment of money, that
he is unable to pay it except out of his income from work and labor,
that he desires to take advantage of the act, and requests that the judge
iH Cross Bay Lumber Co., Inc. v. Samoa, 161 Misc. 458, 293 N. Y. S. 794
(1936). See also D. Appleton Century Co. v. Partridge, 255 App. Div. 830, 7 N. Y. S.
(2d) 47 (1938); order reduced from $25 to $15, Gesell v. Gesell, 249 App. Div. 735,
292 N. Y. S. 942 (1936); order raised from $1.50 per week to $IO per week, Powell
& Titus, Inc. v. Segal, 250 App. Div. 733, 293 N. Y. S. 362 (1937). In one case
a judgment debtor earned $18 per week, and by gifts from relatives his income was
raised to some $90 to $108 per week. The court issued an instalment order requiring
the judgment debtor to pay $10 a week until the judgment was paid. The relatives at
once ceased donating to the judgment debtor, who thereupon applied for a modification of the instalment order. The trial court refused the modification. This was
reversed on appeal. The court held that the gifts could be reached by the instalment
order, but there was no way by which the relatives could be required to make their
gifts in the future, and that the failure to make the gifts was a change of circumstances
warranting a modification of the instalment order. Bergman v. Buechler, 249 App.
Div. 553, 292 N. Y. S. 882 (1937).
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notify the creditors, call a hearing and set the payments in instalments.
The petitioner further states the name of his employer, his address, the
amount he receives as wages and the dates of his pay days. Inasmuch
as this latter information should be submitted by affidavit, the petition
must be verified when such information is included.
Notices are then sent to the judgment creditor or creditors and a
hearing is held at which the judgment debtor is examined concerning
his assets and earnings. He makes the payment directly to the clerk of
the court and the creditor comes to the court to get his check, signing
the docket for the amount received. The debtor is given a receipt for
his payment. On the file envelope of the case is stamped the time of
receipt of the payment from the debtor, the date of payment, and the
number of the check used in making the payment to the creditor. No
fee is charged the debtor for filing the petition and the clerk makes no
charge for filling it in.
The Hamtramck Justice Court averages approximately 1700 civil
cases per year. In the twelve months period preceding February 1,
1939, the clerk's office of this court issued 8200 checks in paying instalment judgments. The clerk estimated that less than five per cent
of the judgment debtors fail to make their payments. In some few cases
the judgment debtor pays directly to the judgment creditor but this
method has not been found satisfactory.
When it is considered that a garnishment fee in the ordinary civil
suit in Hamtramck is $3.50 and that many garnishments would probably have been issued on these judgments, one can realize that the act
results in economy, not only in costs to debtors and creditors but also in
time to the clerk's office and to employers in making disclosures on
garnishment examinations.
If the debtor misses a payment the clerk ascertains the reason and
usually gives the debtor another week or two to make good on his
payments. If he does not do so the court will allow garnishments to go
through against him.
In the Flint Municipal Court it is estimated that some fifty per
cent of the judgments rendered in civil suits are set in instalment payments. By court rule, if the debtor misses two payments, the creditor
can come in and garnish. The percentage of failures of debtors to keep
up their payments is large in Flint. It is a common practice there for
a defendant to come in when sued and merely ask that the judgment
payments be set in instalments without offering any defense. Indeed,
the practice of setting judgment payments in instalments is so com-
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man that the garnishee affidavit form for garnishment on judgment
formerly rendered, as supplied by the clerk, contains the statement that
"Defendant has failed to make the last two payments on said judgment.•.."
The method of determining the amount of each payment is based
upon several factors. The judge considers the payments the debtor
must make upon other judgments, if any, the necessities of life according to the debtor's circumstances, e.g., whether he is married, the size
of his family and their needs, the sources of the debts upon which the
judgment is based, whether for radio, jewelry, clothing, food, fuel,
rent, etc., and orders payments made accordingly. The judge tries to
see that the necessities of life are paid so that the debtor can secure
credit of like kind again when needed.
Occasionally a debtor will try to abuse the privileges of this act by
asking that the judgment be paid in instalments, and then requesting a
postponement of the hearing on his petition so that the postponed date
of the hearing will be beyond his pay day. He will thus stop any
garnishment proceedings and at the same time secure a pay check,
sometimes two, free from any legally enforceable outside claims. The
Michigan statute merely provides that the notice to the creditor must
be given at least four days previous to the hearing, but does not specify
how long it may go without hearing. 115 This deficiency could be rectified by rule of court, general practice, or amendment of the statute.
Obviously, if it appeared that the debtor were trying to take unfair
advantage of the court and the judgment creditor, the judge would
have the power to dismiss his petition as a fraud upon the court and
allow the creditor to have writs of garnishment issued.
In the Municipal Court of Highland Park, like Hamtramck a
suburb of Detroit but an independent political unit, nearly all the
judgments rendered in civil cases are set in instalment payments. Many
of the fines in criminal cases as well are set in instalment payments. If
the debtor is laid off entirely from work the instalment order is regarded there as a continuing order and is in force when he returns to
work.
The one great difficulty that this court has experienced in the use
of the act is that many of the debtors work in Detroit proper and there
have judgments taken against them. When another judgment is rendered in Highland Park and an application made for an instalment
115

22 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1938), § 27.1483.
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order, it is difficult for the judge to order payments made on several
judgments and still leave the debtor enough money upon which to
support his family.
In the Pontiac Municipal Court various methods of applying the
statute were tried in an endeavor to secure the best results possible.
The first system used called for a flat rate of payment per week by the
debtor. If he were out of work and could not make these payments, the
creditor would have the order set aside, after which the debtor would
be subject to garnishment. It was soon realized that this method did
not take into consideration the needs of the actual debtor and his family
then before the court, and that injustice resulted from a set payment
order in periods of uncertain employment. The present system was
then adopted. Now a minimum amount is set which the debtor must
earn before he is required to make any payments. A scale was set up,
based upon actual living costs, with adjustments made to fit individual
cases where required. These payments are made directly to the judgment creditor, who gives a receipt to the judgment debtor. When payments on several judgments against the same debtor are set in instalments, there arises the problem of apportioning .the amounts to be paid
to each. Deficiency judgments on repossessed cars cause much difficulty
for they are usually large. Whether such a judgment is one for a deficiency in repossession cases is a factor considered by the judge.
The present system seems to be highly succesful in the Pontiac
Municipal Court. Each Saturday, which is motion day in that court,
from thirty to forty judgment petitions are heard and payments on
them set in instalments. The judge estimates that failures have totalled
only about five per cent since it went into effect, far fewer than theretofore.

III
PossIBLE UsEs oF INSTALMENT PAYMENT ORDERS WITHOUT
STATUTORY AUTHORITY

While two cases have· held that there is no authority at common law
for the issuance of an order requiring the judgment debtor to make
instalment payments on a judgment, the judges of the Cleveland
Municipal Court have, by rule, adopted·a practice in their conciliation
division of ordering judgments paid in instalments where that method
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is deemed advisable.116 The method has been used for some time in
Cleveland with very good results where the debtor has only one or
two judgments against him. Where there are more, the court has found
a resort to "trusteeship" the only practicable remedy.
In courts of general jurisdiction where pre-trial procedure is· used,
when the defendant has obviously no defense but is defending to gain
time only, there is no reason why, if such an attempt is justifiable, the
parties could not enter into a consent judgment whereby the debtor
would make payments periodically into court in such amount as the
pre-trial judge would deem adequate. The case could be held on the
pre-trial docket for future conferences if necessary, or adjourned froll¼
date to date upon condition that the debtor has made his payment on
that date. This system has been tried in Detroit in several hundred
cases, evidently with some success. 111
The pre-trial method may have some advantages over present
statutes. One commentator says:
"This practice is more elastic than that provided by statutes
authorizing payment of money judgments in instalments, because statutory instalments must be paid in precisely stated amounts
at unfailingly regular intervals, on pain of immediate issuance of
execution. Under the moratorium device worked by the pre-trial
judges, the court may extend an adjourned day, or grant another
adjournment on payment of slightly less than the stipulated sum,
if such course appears to be just to both creditor and debtor." 118

IV
EVALUATION OF INSTALMENT ORDER STATUTES

From the viewpoint both of the judgment debtor and judgment
creditor there are several disadvantages in the acts and their administration. Many courts adopt a stereotyped form of setting instalment
payments. These do not improve the system of garnishment exemp116

This rule was promulgated under authority of Ohio Gen. Code ( 1940),

§ l 579-19 ( 5), conferring rule-making power upon the court. The conciliation division
has jurisdiction up to $50, but if the concilation clerk is reasonably assured that the
plaintiff has a meritorious claim in an amount not to exceed $ 100, and he is indigent,
the case may be handled in the conciliation division. Rules of the Municipal Court of
Cleveland (1936), Conciliation Branch, pp. 57-59.
117
Cooper, "Pre-Trial Procedure in the Wayne County Circuit Court, Detroit,
Michigan," S1xTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE Juo1c1AL CouNCIL OF MICHIGAN 63

(1936).
118

Id. at 68.
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tions for wage earners, and the flexibility which is inherent in the acts is
not utilized. Judgment creditors whose judgments have not been set
in instalment payments may come in and garnish the judgment debtor,
with the result that his wages .are tied up and he cannot make the payments already ordered on prior judgments. When a judgment debtor
is paying upon one judgment presumably all that he can spare from his
wages and still maintain himself and family free from want, and
another judgment is rendered against him upon which a wage garnishment is issued, or an instalment order is sought, the :first creditor must
take less than he has been getting or the judgment debtor is forced
below the subsistence level. Especially is this true in areas such as
Detroit where the various suburbs are independent political units and
debtors may reside in one unit and work in another, making them subject to suit in either jurisdiction. Before the debtor can secure judicial
protection from garnishment through this device, the plaintiff must
invoke the ritualistic formula for securing the judgment, with its attendant costs, despite the fact that the defendant may not contest
either his liability or the amount of the claim.
One of the most difficult drawbacks to the success of any instalment
order act is that the debtor is :first allowed to draw his wages and then
to make the proper payment on the judgment. Human nature is such
that many small debtors in the marginal economic group fail to make
the required payment, and are immediately back in the same situation
which antedated the instalment order.119 Probably more payments are
missed due to the absence of a sense of :financial responsibility than
from wilful intention to defraud the judgment creditor. The drawback
here mentioned is not inherent in the law, however. The power to commit for contempt in these cases may aid in overcoming this :final drawback.
The advantages of the instalment method of paying judgments are
several. It places the onus upon the judgment debtor to pay. The burden of :finding property of the defendant against which execution may
issue, and the risk of executing upon property which apparently belongs
to the judgment debtor but which actually does not, is avoided. It
places judgment creditors whose judgments are being paid in instalments upon an equal plane and eliminates the race among them to get
110 Woodbridge, "Wage Earners' Receiverships," 23 J.
245 (1940); id., NINTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
57 at 71 (1939).
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in the first garnishment each pay day. It reaches the wages of government employees which might otherwise be exempt from wage garnishment.12<1 It reaches the income of the "fee man." It is not so circumscribed by set statutory exemptions that it cannot be patterned to the
individual case. Thus it allows the judgment debtor to pay according to
his present ability, with power in the court to make any modification in
the order which changed circumstances require. Where this power is
exercised properly, the debtor will not be likely to feel so financially
engulfed as to fall prey to bankruptcy thoughts. Under the Michigan
statute the debtor may seek the protection of the court from repeated
wage garnishments at the hands of the judgment creditor with a consequent saving of garnishment costs and other fees. In other states the
creditor is the moving party. The i~stalment order, being issued directly
to the judgment debtor, need not be brought to the attention of his
employer. Consequently there is much less likelihood of his being discharged due to financial difficulties than through orthodox wage garnishment or an instalment execution proceedings, or any other third
party order issued to the employer requiring him to segregate the instalment amount and to pay it or all the debtor's wages to the court.
It provides a method of reaching what should be the true income of a
fraudulent debtor working for a near relative or a "family corporation."
It may reach income from gifts. 121 And it may, if the statute is so
drafted, effectively solve the fraudulent conveyance problem.122 It
adopts a modern method of business, namely the instalment principle,
and finally it streamlines judgment collection processes symmetrically
with the procedure for securing the judgment.
120
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